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DRUGS: YOU USE, YOU GAIN?  WHY 
COURTS SHOULD UPHOLD LONG-TERM 
DISABILITY BENEFITS FOR RECOVERING 
ADDICTS 
 
Gregory M. Juell* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In July 2004, a member of a Massachusetts hospital’s nursing 
staff found Dr. Julie Colby, an anesthesiologist, unconscious on a 
hospital table.1 Dr. Colby had served as a partner in a Merrimack 
anesthesiology practice for sixteen years when she became 
addicted to Fentanyl, an opioid commonly used in the practice.2 
She took a leave of absence to enter an inpatient substance 
treatment facility, where she was diagnosed with an opioid 
dependence, depression, and obsessive-compulsive personality 
traits.3 Pursuant to her employer’s group employee benefit plan, 
her insurer provided long-term disability (LTD) benefits during 
inpatient treatment.4 She remained at the treatment facility until 
November 2004 when she left to begin outpatient treatment, 
during which she was under regular medical supervision and did 
not resume her use of Fentanyl.5 Nevertheless, the Massachusetts 
Board of Registration in Medicine revoked her license and her 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015; A.B., Dartmouth College, 
2007. I would like to thank the Journal staff, for their helpful comments and 
edits; my sister, for inspiring my interest in the public health; and my parents, 
for their unending encouragement and support. 
1 Brief of Plaintiff–Appellee at 3, Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 
58 (1st Cir. 2013) (No. 11-2270). 
2  Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 2013). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. See infra Part II for more background on LTD benefits. 
5 Colby, 705 F.3d at 60. 
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insurer refused to provide benefits for any of her outpatient 
treatment because it did not consider her risk of relapse a 
“current disability” under her employee benefit plan.6  
Unfortunately, Dr. Colby’s experience is not particularly rare 
among anesthesiologists.  A 2005 study surveying anesthesiology 
residency programs from 1991 to 2001 determined that eighty 
percent of programs reported opioid abuse among residents and 
nineteen percent reported pretreatment fatalities from opioid 
abuse.7 While most residents attempted to reenter anesthesiology 
after treatment, only forty-six percent who attempted reentry had 
completed an anesthesiology residency at the time of the survey. 
The substance-related death rate for those who remained in 
anesthesiology was nine percent.8 Forty percent of those who 
were treated and returned to medicine ultimately entered another 
specialty.9 Long-term follow-up for treated residents indicated 
that fifty-six percent were successful in medicine, though often in 
a different specialty.10  
Possible factors contributing to high rates of drug abuse 
among anesthesiologists include: ease of access to highly 
addictive drugs, the ease of diverting small quantities for personal 
use, a high-stress work environment, and the increased sensitivity 
                                                          
6 Id.; see also Plaintiff Julie Colby’s Combined Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Brief at 9, Colby v. Assurant Emp. 
Benefits, 818 F. Supp. 2d 365 (D. Mass. 2011) (No. 07-11488-RCL). The 
plan at issue defined “total disability” as “an injury, sickness, or pregnancy 
[that] requires that you be under the regular care and attendance of a doctor, 
and prevents you from performing at least one of the material duties of your 
regular occupation.” Complaint at 4, Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 818 F. 
Supp. 2d 365 (D. Mass. 2011) (No. 07CV11488). Disabilities must be 
“current” in order for individuals to receive benefits. Id. 
7 Ethan O. Bryson & Jeffrey H. Silverstein, Addiction and Substance 
Abuse in Anesthesiology, 109 ANESTHESIOLOGY 905, 905 (2008). 
8 Gregory B. Collins et al., Chemical Dependency Treatment Outcomes 
of Residents in Anesthesiology: Results of a Survey, 101 ANESTHESIA & 
ANALGESIA 1457, 1457 (2005). 
9 Id. at 1459. 
10 Id. at 1460. Long-term follow-up data was available for ninety-three 
percent (185/199) of the study residents. Id. 
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of the brain’s reward pathways11 resulting from workplace 
exposure to the drug.12 Unsurprisingly then, anesthesiologists and 
others in the field are common plaintiffs in Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA)13 actions against insurers that deny 
LTD benefits to individuals recovering from substance abuse 
disorders.14  
Because of the prevalence of anesthesiologist plaintiffs in 
cases determining whether recovering addicts should be entitled 
to LTD benefits, the cases discussed in this Note focus on the 
anesthesiology context. However, whether insurers should be 
required to provide LTD benefits to recovering addicts is an 
important question in any field, particularly those in which the 
public health and safety are at risk. Additionally, this Note 
focuses on ERISA-governed LTD plans. As the following 
discussion will demonstrate, it is in this context that the case for 
treating the risk of relapse as a “current disability” is particularly 
strong. However, many of the arguments that follow will be 
equally applicable outside of the ERISA context. 
Courts are divided as to whether the risk of relapse into drug 
addiction constitutes a “current disability.”15 Under LTD benefit 
plans, a disability is generally defined for the first year or two as 
                                                          
11 Reward pathways are the parts of the brain that are “responsible for 
driving our feelings of motivation, reward and behavior.” See The Reward 
Pathway Reinforces Behavior, GENETIC SCI. LEARNING CTR., 
http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/addiction/rewardbehavior/ (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2014). 
12 Bryson & Silverstein, supra note 7, at 905.  
13 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). 
14 See, e.g., Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013); 
Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785 (W.D. Mich. 
2009).  For more information on ERISA, see infra Part I.  
15 Compare Colby, 705 F.3d 58 (upholding reversal of LTD benefit 
denial), with Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(upholding LTD benefit denial). The disability plan at issue in Stanford defined 
disability as “injury or Sickness [that] causes physical or mental impairment to 
such a degree of severity that You are . . . continuously unable to perform the 
Material and Substantial Duties of Your Regular Occupation.” Brief of 
Appellant at 10, Stanford, 514 F.3d 354 (No. 06-2006). For a claimant to be 
entitled to benefits, his disability must therefore be “current.” Id. 
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a condition that prevents one from engaging in his regular 
occupation.16 Afterward, the definition changes: it requires that 
the individual be unable to perform any gainful occupation.17  
If a court determines that the risk of relapse is a “current 
disability,” then it will require the insurer to provide benefits 
under standard LTD benefit plans.18 The First and Fourth Circuits 
have come to opposite conclusions on this issue.19 The First 
Circuit in Colby v. Union Security Insurance Co.20 determined 
that the risk of relapse into drug abuse is akin to the risk of 
relapse into cardiac distress or orthopedic complications, and can 
therefore be so severe as to constitute a current disability for 
which LTD benefits must be provided. The court explained that a 
current disability could exist even when an individual is 
physically capable of performing his job.21  
By contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Stanford v. Continental 
Casualty Co.22 came to a different conclusion. In Stanford, the 
insurer had determined that the “potential risk of relapse” is not a 
current disability for which LTD benefits must be provided, and 
the court held that the insurer did not abuse its discretion in 
                                                          
16 Diane B. Hill, Employer-Sponsored Long-Term Disability Insurance, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 16, 17 (1987), 
http://bls.gov/opub/mlr/1987/07/ 
art2full.pdf. 
17 Id. 
18 For more traditional types of conditions for which courts have upheld 
LTD benefits, see generally Rothman v. Office Env’ts of New England Health 
& Welfare Benefit Plan, 794 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D.Ma. 2011) (awarding LTD 
benefits to a salesperson who suffered from post-concussion syndrome); 
Adams v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Ga. 
2010) (holding that a plan participant who experienced cognitive problems 
following a stroke was entitled to LTD benefits); Alexander v. Winthrop, 
Simpson, Putnam & Roberts Long Term Disability Coverage, 497 F. Supp. 2d 
429 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (upholding LTD benefits to a legal secretary who 
suffered from persistent and severe lower back pain). 
19 Compare Colby, 705 F.3d 58 (upholding reversal of LTD benefit 
denial), with Stanford, 514 F.3d 354 (upholding LTD benefit denial). 
20 Colby, 705 F.3d at 59–60. 
21 Id. at 66. 
22 Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358–59. 
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making this determination.23 The court ruled that while the risk of 
relapse into cardiac arrest is a likely result of a stressful work 
environment, the risk of relapse into substance abuse is a 
choice.24 Also in contrast to the First Circuit, the Fourth Circuit 
distinguished heart conditions from drug addiction on the ground 
that one who is heart attack-prone has a current physical 
impairment, while one who risks relapse into substance 
dependence does not.25 The court agreed with the insurer that the 
mere risk of relapse is not a current disability for which the 
insurer must provide LTD benefits.26   
This Note examines whether the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Stanford was justified and asserts that Stanford contravenes both 
Supreme Court precedent and the congressional intent that 
motivated ERISA’s passage. Furthermore, Stanford is at odds 
with current psychology literature, which views addiction as a 
disease rather than a choice, and there is no compelling reason 
why ERISA plan administrators should treat the risk of relapse 
differently from other chronic medical conditions. Finally, the 
Fourth Circuit failed to properly take into account the potentially 
disastrous public policy consequences of Stanford. The First 
Circuit’s decision in Colby is more firmly grounded in law and 
psychology, and it makes for better public policy. Colby 
therefore provides better guidance for future courts confronted 
with the issue of whether to construe the risk of relapse as a 
disability for which LTD benefits should be provided. 
Part II provides a brief historical background of ERISA and 
LTD benefits. Part III details the differences between Colby and 
Stanford, and discusses related decisions by other courts.27 Part 
                                                          
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 358. 
25 Id. at 359. 
26 Id. at 361. 
27 John Utz questions whether Colby and Stanford truly created a circuit 
split because the two courts were interpreting different plans. John L. Utz, 
Addict’s Risk of Relapse as Disability, 21 ERISA LITIG. REP., no. 2, 2013, at 
6. However, a true split is apparent given the courts’ completely divergent 
attitudes regarding the nature of addiction. Utz’s skepticism also ignores Judge 
Wilkinson’s dissenting opinion in Stanford, which was echoed in Colby, and 
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IV examines recent psychology literature on addiction and how 
scholars in the field have come to regard addiction as a disease 
rather than a choice. Finally, Part V examines why Stanford is 
flawed and argues that courts should therefore follow the First 
Circuit in treating the risk of relapse into substance abuse as a 
“current disability.”  
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ERISA AND LTD BENEFITS 
 
During the Second World War, several economic factors 
contributed to an older workforce in the years that followed.28 
One factor was wartime inflation, which discouraged retirement 
by reducing the value of Social Security Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance.29 Another was the policy of many firms to directly 
discourage retirement.30 Due to the resulting older workforce, 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) unions began to 
prioritize the interests of older workers by emphasizing 
retirement benefits in their collective bargaining agreements.31 
However, increased retirement benefits for older workers 
typically came at the expense of liberal vesting requirements and 
other policies that would have benefited younger workers.32 
Additionally, CIO unions often bargained for systems requiring 
employers to lay off workers in reverse order of seniority.33 
Events at Studebaker-Packard34 highlighted the vulnerability 
                                                          
demonstrates how judges’ differing attitudes toward addiction can result in 
sharply different interpretations of a benefit plan. See Stanford, 514 F.3d at 
361–65 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
28 James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the 
Business”: the Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 
BUFF. L. REV. 683, 687 (2001). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 688. When funds are “vested,” an employee has an absolute right 
to them. Employers cannot reclaim vested funds. 
33 Id. 
34 Studebaker was an American automobile manufacturer. It merged with 
the Packard Motor Car Company in 1954 to form Studebaker-Packard. Due to 
poor sales, Packard ceased operations in 1958. Studebaker continued to 
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of younger workers under these systems.35 During the 1950s, 
adverse economic events, such as the loss of wartime defense 
contracts and a recession, made it more difficult for independent 
automobile manufacturers to compete with larger firms.36 As a 
result of these events, in December 1963 Studebaker-Packard 
closed its plant in South Bend, Indiana.37 To make matters worse 
for the employees, Studebaker-Packard’s pension plan lacked 
adequate funds and the company defaulted on its obligations to 
workers under sixty, with some workers receiving nothing at 
all.38 This was the result of a 1961 collective bargaining 
agreement, which favored older workers by prioritizing retirees 
and retirement-eligible employees over younger workers.39 The 
plant’s shutdown gained national attention when advocates of 
pension reform repeatedly invoked the default as a symbol of the 
need for regulation and reform.40  While the closing of 
Studebaker-Packard became a rallying cry for pension reform 
advocates, pension reform remained controversial and it took 
more than a decade for substantial reform to occur.41 
The reform effort culminated on Labor Day in 1974, when 
President Gerald Ford signed into law the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA).42 Congress enacted ERISA in 
order to ensure that employees actually receive promised benefits 
in accordance with a benefit plan’s terms.43 To this end, ERISA 
imposes minimum standards for private industry pension plan 
                                                          
manufacture cars until 1966. History, STUDEBAKER NAT’L MUSEUM, 
http://www.studebakermuseum.org/p/about/history/ (last visited Apr. 25, 
2014). 
35 Wooten, supra note 28, at 684.  
36 Id. at 693. 
37 Id. at 683–84. 
38 Id. at 684. 
39 Id. at 731. 
40 Id. at 684. 
41 Id. at 739. 
42 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
43 LEE T. POLK, 1 ERISA PRACTICE AND LITIGATION § 1:1 (2013). See 
also 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). 
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administrators and creates causes of action for plan participants 
and their beneficiaries.44 ERISA-imposed duties are derived from 
the common law of trusts.45 Fiduciaries are therefore required to 
discharge their duties with the prudence of a reasonable man 
under like circumstances.46 They must also “act solely in the 
interests of participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive 
purposes of providing benefits and defraying reasonable expenses 
of the plan.”47 The statute creates a private cause of action against 
plan administrators who fail to meet their obligations.48 While 
ERISA sets a benefit floor, employers can choose to provide 
greater benefits.49 Courts may therefore enforce a contractual 
obligation to provide benefits beyond what the statute requires.50   
ERISA’s “standards of fiduciary responsibility” govern both 
“pension plans” and “welfare plans.”51 “Pension plans” include 
an array of deferred compensation plans, while “welfare plans” 
include a variety of benefits, such as disability insurance.52 LTD 
insurance is designed to provide income to employees who are 
unable to work for extended periods due to prolonged disability.53 
                                                          
44 ERISA, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/erisa (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2014). ERISA also regulates the impact of federal income taxes 
on the management of benefit plans. Id. 
45 POLK, supra note 43, § 1:6. Trust law establishes principles by which 
one holds property for another’s benefit. 
46 H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 4659 (2007). ERISA defines a “fiduciary” as 
the entity that manages the benefit plan and its assets. Often, both an employer 
and a hired administrator will serve as benefit plan fiduciaries. ERISA 
Fiduciary Advisor, DEPT. OF LAB., 
http://www.dol.gov/elaws/ebsa/fiduciary/q4a.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2014). 
47 2 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D ERISA – Arbitrary Denial of Benefits 
Under Disability Income Plan § 1 (1988). 
48 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
49 PAUL J. ROUTH, WELFARE BENEFITS GUIDE § 2:27 (1973). 
50 Id. 
51 POLK, supra note 43, § 1:3. 
52 Id. 
53 ROUTH, supra note 49, § 2:27 (“It is not uncommon for a plan to 
provide that disability means the inability to perform one’s regular duties for 
two years. After that, the definition often changes requiring the person to 
demonstrate an inability to perform any occupation for which the employee is 
reasonably qualified.”). This ongoing inability is what renders a disability 
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The income amount is generally a predetermined percentage of 
the employee’s pre-disability earnings.54 Employees typically 
must have worked for an employer for a period of five months to 
a year before becoming eligible for LTD benefits.55 In addition, 
employees must be disabled for an extended period, usually three 
to five months, before LTD benefits begin.56 Thus, the LTD 
benefit period typically begins when the short-term disability 
period ends.57 LTD benefit payments are generally payable until 
recovery, a specific age, or retirement.58 Additionally, LTD 
payments may be reduced if an employee is only partially 
disabled, meaning the employee can either perform some duties 
of his original occupation or can perform another occupation in 
which his earnings are reduced.59 
In an action for benefits, the court’s standard of review will 
depend on whether the plan gives the administrator discretion to 
construe the plan’s terms.60 If the administrator is given no such 
discretion, the court will review the denial of benefits de novo.61 
If the administrator is given such discretion, the court will apply 
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review,62 a deferential 
standard in which reversal is only appropriate if the lower court 
has failed to exercise sound and reasonable judgment.63 However, 
if an administrator with discretion is operating under a conflict of 
interest, the reviewing court will consider this as a factor in 
                                                          
“current.” 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Diane B. Hill, Employer-Sponsored Long-Term Disability Insurance, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 16, 16 (1987), available at http://bls.gov/opub/ 
mlr/1987/07/art2full.pdf. 
59 Id. at 17. 
60 RONALD J. COOKE, 3 ERISA PRACTICE AND LITIGATION § 8:46 (2013).   
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Abuse of Discretion, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
wex/abuse_of_discretion (last visited Mar. 29, 2014). 
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determining whether the administrator has abused its discretion.64 
 
III.RISK OF RELAPSE AS A CURRENT DISABILITY 
 
Courts are conflicted as to whether the risk of relapse into 
substance abuse constitutes a “current” disability under LTD 
plans.65 As noted earlier, the First and Fourth Circuits disagree 
on this issue. The Fourth Circuit contends that the risk of relapse 
involves a choice component and is not a continuous disability,66 
while the First Circuit asserts that the risk may be so severe as to 
render an individual “currently” disabled.67 However, such 
disagreement is not confined to the First and Fourth Circuits.68 
Below is an overview of cases addressing this important question.  
 
A. Cases Upholding the Denial of Benefits 
 
1. Stanford v. Continental Casualty Co.69 
 
Robert Stanford worked as a nurse anesthetist at Beaufort 
Memorial Hospital in South Carolina when he became addicted to 
Fentanyl, an anesthetic used in his practice.70 After completing a 
twenty-eight-day inpatient treatment program, he returned to 
work only to relapse two months later.71 He then began a ninety-
day inpatient treatment program and filed for LTD benefits 
                                                          
64 COOKE, supra note 60, § 8:46.   
65 Compare, e.g., Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 
2013) (requiring LTD benefits), with Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 
F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding LTD benefit denial). 
66 Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358 (“Whether [an addict] succumbs to that 
temptation remains his choice; the heart-attack prone doctor has no such 
choice.”). 
67 Colby, 705 F.3d at 60 (“[A] risk of relapse into substance dependence . 
. . can swell to so significant a level so as to constitute a current disability.”). 
68 However, the First and Fourth Circuits are the only federal appeals 
courts to have addressed this question. 
69 Id. at 354; Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 438 
(E.D.N.C. 2006). 
70 Stanford, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 439. 
71 Id. at 440; Stanford, 514 F.3d at 364. 
2014.05.13 JUELL.DOCX 5/20/2014  10:44 AM 
 DRUGS: YOU USE, YOU GAIN? 1017 
pursuant to his employer’s disability plan, administered by 
insurer Continental Casualty Company.72   
The insurer initially granted Mr. Stanford’s request for LTD 
benefits.73 However, after Mr. Stanford spent several months in 
recovery, the insurer terminated his benefits, citing a lack of 
medical evidence that he was functionally unable to perform “the 
material and substantial duties of [his] regular occupation.”74 Mr. 
Stanford appealed the insurer’s decision to terminate his 
benefits.75 Along with the appeal, he submitted a letter from his 
treating physician, which stated that he could not return to work 
as a nurse anesthetist because he should not be subjected to 
controlled substances and because the effects of his treatment 
medication could put patients at risk.76 After the insurer denied 
the appeal, Mr. Stanford filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina alleging 
wrongful termination of benefits.77 The court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the insurer, stating that the risk of relapse 
did not render Mr. Stanford disabled because he was not 
“continuously unable” to perform his duties.78  
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court.79 It took a 
narrow view of what constituted a “mental impairment” under the 
insurer’s ERISA-governed plan and stated that while Mr. 
Stanford could not return to his old job, he was nevertheless 
“physically and mentally capable of performing that job and 
countless other jobs.”80 It further argued that addiction is a 
choice: “[w]hether [an addict] succumbs to that temptation 
remains his choice; the heart-attack prone doctor has no such 
choice.”81 The court therefore upheld the insurer’s determination 
                                                          
72  Stanford, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 440. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 440–41. 
77 Id. at 441. 
78 Id. at 443. 
79 Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 361 (4th Cir. 2008). 
80 Id. at 359. 
81 Id. at 358. 
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that “Stanford no longer suffered from physical or mental 
impairments as a result of his drug use or his recovery, [and] the 
fact that he remained an addict did not [prevent him from 
performing] the material and substantial duties of [his] regular 
occupation.”82 
However, the Stanford court was sharply divided. Judge J. 
Harvie Wilkinson wrote an impassioned dissent, describing the 
majority’s conclusion as “an uncommonly harsh result.”83 He 
argued that the majority’s holding rested on two “abstractions” 
not grounded in law.84 The majority’s first “abstraction” was that 
a disability plan was not required to cover “potential risk of 
relapse.”85 According to Judge Wilkinson, the majority’s 
rejection of “potential risk of relapse” as a current impairment 
appeared to exclude all serious medical conditions that could 
make performing one’s job “unreasonably dangerous” because an 
individual could technically perform a job function at grave 
medical risk.86 According to Judge Wilkinson, such an exclusion 
contravened “a basic tenet of insurance law that an insured is 
disabled when the activity in question would aggravate a serious 
condition affecting the insured’s health.”87 The second 
“abstraction” was the majority’s assertion “that for disability 
purposes, ‘a physical condition such as a heart attack . . . is 
different from the risk of relapse into drug use.’”88 Judge 
Wilkinson stated that the majority’s attempt to distinguish these 
conditions was insufficient, as it rested on “moral considerations” 
that were not the court’s to make.89 
Judge Wilkinson also argued that the majority’s position was 
                                                          
82 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
83 Id. at 361 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 361. 
86 Id. at 362. 
87 Id. at 362–63 (citation omitted). 
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 363. As an example, he explained that a laborer who could 
literally lift heavy objects, but only at the risk of partial paralysis, would likely 
prevail in an action for benefits. Id. 
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unsupported by the plan’s plain language.90 He noted that the plan 
covered “mental impairments” severe enough that one is “unable 
to perform the material and substantial duties of [his] regular 
occupation.”91 He defined “mental impairments” more broadly 
than the majority and pointed out that the plan defined “mental 
impairments” according to the American Psychiatric 
Association’s diagnostic manual, which devotes an entire section 
to substance-related disorders, including addiction.92  
Judge Wilkinson also made strong public policy arguments 
against the majority’s holding.93 He pointed out that the insurer’s 
requirement that Mr. Stanford relapse in order to obtain disability 
benefits would not only create, as the majority acknowledged, a 
“perverse-incentive structure” by only paying benefits upon 
relapse, but would “thwart the very purpose for which disability 
plans exist: to help people overcome medical adversity if 
possible, and otherwise to cope with it.”94 Because he did not 
believe that the risk of relapse could be categorically excluded 
from coverage, he argued that the proper inquiry as to whether a 
condition constitutes a current disability is “fact-intensive” and 
should focus on the likelihood and severity of the risk.95 Judge 
Wilkinson concluded that Mr. Stanford’s prior relapses and the 
extensive medical evidence indicating that his risk of relapse was 
severe rendered him “currently” disabled.96  
 
2. Allen v. Minnesota Life Insurance Co.97 
 
Allen v. Minnesota Life Insurance Co, while not based on an 
ERISA claim, involves facts similar to Stanford.98 In Allen, Dr. 
                                                          
90 Id. at 362. 
91 Id. at 361. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 362–63. 
94 Id. at 362. 
95 Id. at 364. 
96 Id. at 364–65. 
97 Allen v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2001). 
98 Id. at 1378–81. Allen’s plan was not ERISA-governed because he 
purchased it individually, not through his employer. 
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Robert Lee Allen, an anesthesiologist who practiced in Virginia, 
brought a breach of contract claim against his disability insurer 
claiming wrongful termination of his benefits.99 Dr. Allen had 
been employed at Anesthesia Associates of Hampton for only a 
month when he began abusing Fentanyl.100 However, less than 
three months after entering an inpatient treatment program, he 
was discharged with a favorable prognosis for recovery provided 
that he adhere to a prescribed treatment plan.101   
Nevertheless, the Virginia Board of Medicine suspended Dr. 
Allen’s license.102 However, it stayed the suspension provided 
that Dr. Allen confine his medical practice to a Board-approved 
residency or fellowship.103 Dr. Allen eventually completed a 
residency in internal medicine and the Board reinstated his license 
to practice medicine on unrestricted status.104 Two months into his 
subsequent employment as an internist at Fayette Medical, his 
insurer notified him that it would discontinue his benefit 
payments.105 Although Dr. Allen was successfully reemployed, he 
was not engaged in his “regular occupation,” so he argued that he 
was entitled to continued benefits.106 However, the court ruled 
that he was not “unable to engage in [his] regular occupation.”107 
The court therefore upheld the insurer’s denial because Dr. Allen 
                                                          
99 Id. at 1378. 
100 Id. at 1379. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 1380. 
103 Id. Dr. Allen commenced a residency in internal medicine shortly 
thereafter, although he returned to inpatient treatment due to concerns that he 
was violating Board-imposed restrictions on his practice. However, undisputed 
evidence indicated that he had not abused Fentanyl or alcohol since his initial 
treatment. Id. 
104 Id. at 1380–81. 
105 Id. at 1381. 
106 Id. at 1383. 
107 Id. (emphasis added). The plan defined “disability” as follows: “You 
have a disability if, because of continuing sickness or injury, you (1) are under 
the regular, reasonable, and customary care of a physician; and (2) are unable 
to engage in your regular occupation,” provided that “you are not earning 
more than 30% of your prior average earned income from your regular 
occupation.” Id. at 1378–79. 
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“suffer[ed] from no physical or mechanical limitations on his 
ability to practice anesthesiology.”108 It further determined that 
even though Dr. Allen’s treating physician testified that he should 
not return to practicing anesthesiology, the physician based his 
opinion on “future potentialities” only, not on any present 
disability.109   
The court also based its decision on its determination that Dr. 
Allen’s disability was not “uninterrupted,” as the plan required.110 
This conclusion was based partially on the testimony of Dr. 
Allen’s treating physician, who provided testimony about his 
anesthesiologist patients generally, and stated that in most cases, 
he recommends a return to the field.111 The physician also gave 
testimony specific to Dr. Allen, and opined that Dr. Allen should 
avoid returning to anesthesiology because of the likelihood of 
relapse.112 The court evidently gave more weight to the general 
testimony than the testimony specific to Dr. Allen.113 It 
interpreted the treating physician’s claim—that he recommends 
most of his patients return to anesthesiology—as an indication 
“that drug addiction does not itself disable someone from 
practicing in that field.”114 It also noted Dr. Allen’s sobriety 
period and a lack of evidence “that he would inevitably 
regress.”115 The court determined that Dr. Allen had no “existing 
impediment” to his ability to practice anesthesiology and upheld 
the denial of Dr. Allen’s benefit payments.116  
                                                          
108 Id. at 1383. While the Colby court determined that the 
anesthesiologist’s “current occupation” was that of a physician, the Allen court 
defined “current occupation” more specifically to mean anesthesiologist. See 
generally Utz, supra note 27 (discussing a possible circuit split over the 
definition of “own occupation” under ERISA-governed LTD benefit plans). 
109 Allen, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1383. 
110 Id. at 1384. The plan required a “continuing disability,” which the 
court interpreted to mean an “uninterrupted” disability. Id. at 1383. 
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 1383–84. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 1383. 
115 Id. at 1384. 
116 Id.  
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3. Price v. Disability RMS117 
 
While anesthesiologists are more likely than other physicians 
to abuse drugs, a stressful work environment and easy access to 
potent drugs contribute to addiction among other physicians as 
well. Dr. Howard Price had worked as a urologist and surgeon at 
Milford-Whitinsville Regional Hospital in Massachusetts when he 
was forced to stop work because he began abusing opioids.118 
However, Dr. Price’s insurer denied his claim for LTD benefits 
because he had not used opioids during the policy’s two-year 
coverage period, which began when Dr. Price stopped 
working.119 After the insurer denied his two subsequent appeals, 
Dr. Price brought an ERISA action, claiming his depression, 
anxiety, and risk of relapse prevented him from performing all of 
the material duties of his occupation.120   
In upholding the insurer’s denial of LTD benefits, the court 
placed significant emphasis on a lack of individualized evidence 
and Dr. Price’s continued “functional capacity.”121 The court 
noted that the letters written by Dr. Price’s substance abuse 
counselor spoke only in general terms and did not make specific 
references to Dr. Price’s ability to function.122 The court further 
noted that the counselor’s delineation of the disability period 
included several weeks during which Dr. Price was still 
practicing, which further illustrated the generality of the 
counselor’s testimony and its failure to illustrate a “functional 
                                                          
117 Price v. Disability RMS, No. 06-10251-GAO, 2008 WL 763255 (D. 
Mass. Mar. 21, 2008). 
118 Id. at *1. 
119 Id. at *17–18. 
120 Id. at *1. 
121 Id. at *18. As used in the opinion, “functional capacity” is simply the 
ability to practice medicine. See id. at *6. 
122 Id. at *19 (“[The doctor’s letter] did not relate the described symptoms 
in any persuasive way to Dr. Price’s functional capacity. How poor [was his 
concentration]? Did his poor concentration prevent him from performing his 
duties? [W]hat must be shown is that the illness caused a loss in functional 
capacity, and that is what was missing.”).  
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impairment.”123   
Price is readily distinguishable from Stanford and Allen. 
Since the court found that Dr. Price did not have a severe risk of 
relapse, it never reached the question of whether a risk of relapse 
could be so severe as to constitute a current disability.124 Also, 
unlike the Allen court, the Price court considered testimony 
specific to Dr. Price in making its determination that Dr. Price’s 
risk of relapse did not constitute a current disability.125 Because of 
these differences, it is unclear whether the court’s conclusion 
would have been different had Dr. Price’s risk of relapse been 
more severe. 
As the above cases reveal, courts upholding denial of benefits 
generally place significant emphasis on an addict’s lack of 
“functional impairment.” Because the risk of relapse does not 
necessarily cause a continuous physical inability to perform one’s 
occupation, these courts do not view the risk of relapse as a 
current disability. 
 
B. Cases Enforcing Continued Benefits  
 
1. Colby v. Union Security Insurance Co.126 
 
The First Circuit’s Colby decision rested on the court’s 
determination that a risk of relapse, while not necessarily a 
functional impairment, could be so serious as to constitute a 
“current disability” under an ERISA plan.127 The opinion cited 
medical testimony on behalf of Dr. Colby and determined that 
she faced a very significant risk of relapse following her 
departure from inpatient treatment.128 The court noted that the 
insurer could have possibly “limit[ed] the period of disability by 
arguing that this risk progressively diminished over the 36-month 
                                                          
123 Id.  
124 Id. at *21–22. 
125 Id.  
126 Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013). 
127 Id. at 60. 
128 Id. at 64. 
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period,”129 but instead “took a categorical approach, steadfastly 
maintaining that risk of relapse, whatever the degree, could not 
constitute a current disability under the plan.”130 The award of a 
full three years of benefits therefore “flowed naturally from [the 
insurer’s] all-or-nothing defense of the case.”131 
The First Circuit also relied on a number of policy grounds in 
reaching its conclusion.132 For example, the court noted that 
denying benefits to those in recovery while providing them to 
those actively using the drug would create “a perverse 
incentive.”133 In addition, denying benefits to those in recovery 
would encourage claimants to return to work immediately upon 
leaving inpatient treatment, which could put their lives and their 
patients’ lives at risk.134 Finally, such a policy would defeat the 
very purpose of a disability plan, which is to help people 
overcome or otherwise cope with medical issues.135  
However, the court also emphasized the narrowness of its 
holding. As noted above, though the court held that Dr. Colby 
was entitled to LTD benefits,136 the insurer’s all-or-nothing 
approach helped the court reach that conclusion. The court 
suggested that the insurer might have had more success had it 
argued for a gradual benefit decrease over the 36-month period.137 
Furthermore, the court pointed out that the insurer could have 
written into the policy an exclusion for risk of relapse, but it 
chose not to.138 Therefore, it ruled that the insurer acted 
                                                          
129 Id. 
130 Id. For an overview of the facts of this case, see supra Part I. 
131 Id. at 68. 
132 Id. at 66–67. 
133 Id. at 66. 
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 67. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. 
138 Id. Judge Wilkinson expressed doubt that such an exclusion would be 
permissible: “Since I do not think risk of addictive relapse and other medical 
risk can categorically be excluded from coverage, . . . .” Stanford v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 364 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., 
dissenting). 
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arbitrarily and capriciously in denying LTD benefits to Dr. 
Colby.139 
 
2. Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Financial Insurance Co.140 
 
Dr. Ronald Kufner, an anesthesiologist who suffered from 
alcohol and opioid dependence, brought an ERISA claim against 
his insurer similar to the claim brought in Colby.141 Dr. Kufner’s 
substance abuse issues forced him to stop work and undergo 
detoxification and other treatments, which included a week in the 
hospital followed by several months in a residential treatment 
program.142 Dr. Kufner received short-term disability benefits for 
thirteen weeks, and his insurer granted his subsequent request for 
LTD benefits.143 After several months, however, the insurer 
terminated Dr. Kufner’s benefits since he had increased his work 
hours and had not experienced a relapse.144  
Dr. Kufner nevertheless maintained that he remained 
disabled.  While anesthesiologists typically work 70 to 80 hours 
per week, Dr. Kufner’s hours were limited to 40 to 50 per week 
by orders from his treating physician, who determined that his 
hours had to be reduced because a stressful work environment 
was a major factor contributing to his substance abuse 
problems.145 The treating physician further restricted him from 
handling or dispensing opioid analgesics.146 Dr. Kufner contended 
that because of these restrictions, his benefit payments should 
have continued.147  
The court determined, largely on public policy grounds, that 
the insurer abused its discretion in discontinuing Dr. Kufner’s 
                                                          
139 Colby, 705 F.3d at 67. 
140 Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785 (W.D. 
Mich. 2009). 
141 Id. at 787. 
142 Id. at 788–89. 
143 Id. at 789. 
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 794. 
146 Id.  
147 Id. at 787. 
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LTD benefits.148 The court criticized the insurer’s decision to cut 
benefits in spite of “overwhelming medical evidence supporting a 
contrary decision.”149 It further pointed out the perversity of the 
insurer’s policy, which would force Dr. Kufner to work to the 
point of relapse at which point he would again be eligible for 
benefits.150 The court described this policy as one of “benefits 
Russian roulette” that put Dr. Kufner’s “career and his patients’ 
lives at risk.”151 The court explained that because anesthesiology 
is incredibly complex and a crucial part of surgery, the insurer’s 
denial of benefits constituted a “breach of the public trust.”152  
The court also based its holding on the insurer’s ERISA-
imposed obligation to discharge its duties “solely in the interests 
of the participants and beneficiaries.”153 Those obligations hold 
insurers to “higher-than-marketplace quality standards” and 
require that “administrators provide a full and fair review of 
claim denials.”154 According to the court, the insurer relied on 
“conclusory ‘peer review’ opinions” by doctors it retained rather 
than the extensive medical evidence and treatment records 
indicating that Dr. Kufner was unable to return to his previous 
level of employment.155 The court concluded that the insurer’s 
determination was thus based on financial self-interest and 
pointed to Dr. Kufner’s entitlement to the plan’s maximum 
allowable benefits as further support for this conclusion.156  
The above case law makes clear that whether a court will 
                                                          
148 Id. at 796. 
149 Id. This evidence included a letter from his treating physician stating 
that he should avoid on-call duty and not work more than 40 hours per week, 
another letter from the treating physician saying he could work up to 50 hours 
per week but that he remained at risk of relapse, and a letter from his treating 
psychiatrist stating that Dr. Kufner could not return to his previous level of 
employment. Id. at 793–94. 
150 Id. at 796. 
151 Id.  
152 Id.  
153 Id. at 796–97. 
154 Id. at 797 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 552 U.S. 105, 115 
(2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  
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uphold LTD benefit payments to a recovering addict will depend 
largely upon how broadly or narrowly the court construes 
“current disability.”  Courts denying benefits commonly interpret 
the phrase in a strictly literal sense, at least with regard to 
recovering addicts.157 In that vein, they are more likely to view an 
addict’s relapse into drug abuse as the choice of an otherwise 
healthy person.158 On the other hand, courts ruling that benefits 
must be provided generally view addiction as a current 
disability—essentially, an ongoing condition.159  
 
IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADDICTION 
 
The preceding section demonstrated how a court’s 
understanding of addiction can affect the result of a case. If a 
court views an addict as one who is not functionally impaired yet 
chooses to use drugs, it will likely deny benefits. On the other 
hand, if a court views an addict as one who suffers from an 
ongoing, current disability, it will likely require that benefits be 
paid. 
The following section places these differing views of 
addiction in the context of recent psychology literature.  
 
A. Basics of Addiction and Environmental Factors that 
Precipitate Relapse 
 
Recent psychology literature is at odds with the Fourth 
Circuit’s contention that addiction is a choice.160 The New 
                                                          
157 See Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 363 (4th Cir. 
2008) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s inconsistency in 
denying benefits to Mr. Stanford when it would likely provide them to an 
individual capable of lifting heavy objects but only at risk of a serious injury). 
158 See supra Part III.A.1. 
159 Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013) (“In our 
view, a risk of relapse into substance abuse—like risk of relapse into cardiac 
distress or risk of relapse into orthopedic complications—can swell to so 
significant a level as to constitute a current disability.”). 
160 See generally David P. Friedman, Drug Addiction: A Chronically 
Relapsing Brain Disease, 70 N.C. MED. J. 35 (2009); see also Philip Gorwood 
et al., Genetics of Dopamine Receptors and Drug Addiction, 131 HUM. 
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England Journal of Medicine describes drug addiction as a 
“chronic, relapsing disorder in which compulsive drug-seeking 
and drug-taking behavior persists despite serious negative 
consequences.”161 While outdated but long-held views often see 
addiction as a moral failure or lack of willpower,162 recent 
neurobiological research indicates that drug addiction is in fact a 
brain disease.163 Drug addiction also has a strong genetic 
component: one study estimated that genetic factors are 
responsible for approximately half of addiction vulnerability.164 
Other research compared drug addiction to atherosclerosis, type 2 
diabetes, and hypertension by noting common characteristics such 
as incurability, the importance of genetic risk factors, the 
influence of lifestyle choices, and the frequency of relapse.165 
Finally, one study described drug addiction as a “chronic 
relapsing disorder” due to similar rates of treatment adherence 
and relapse when compared to type 2 diabetes, hypertension, and 
asthma.166 As with these other chronic illnesses, the majority of 
recovering addicts experience relapse, often after periods of 
significant improvement.167 
Despite the similarities between addiction and other chronic 
ailments, insurance companies place much greater limitations 
upon benefits for recovering addicts.168 Researchers have 
                                                          
GENETICS 803 (2012) (describing drug dependence as a “chronic, relapsing 
disorder”); Doug Sellman, The 10 Most Important Things Known About 
Addiction, 105 ADDICTION 6, 7 (2010) (describing addiction as a “complex 
genetic disease”). 
161 Jordi Cami & Magi Farré, Mechanisms of Disease: Drug Addiction, 
349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 975, 975 (2003). 
162 Friedman, supra note 160, at 35 (citing Stephen J. Morse, Medicine 
and Morals, Craving and Compulsion, 39 SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MISUSE 437, 
438–39 (2004) (arguing that addicts should, to some degree, be “held 
responsible for addiction-related behavior, such as seeking and using drugs”)). 
163 Friedman, supra note 160, at 35. 
164 Chuan-Yun Li et al., Genes and (Common) Pathways Underlying Drug 
Addiction, 4 PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 28, 28 (2008). 
165 Friedman, supra note 160, at 36. 
166 Sellman, supra note 160, at 8. 
167 See id. 
168 Friedman, supra note 160, at 36. 
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attributed this discrepancy to deeply-held biases and a lack of 
positive humanitarian feelings toward addicted individuals,169 
which often lead to stigmatization and incarceration rather than 
proper treatment.170 The reasons for this lack of “positive 
humanitarian attitudes” toward addicts are undoubtedly complex, 
but likely explanations include the history of drug illegalization 
and the illegal drug trade, as well as a lack of understanding of 
addiction science. 
Drug addiction has biological effects on the human body that 
are not easily overcome. Addiction triggers learning 
mechanisms171 and induces chemical and anatomical changes in 
the brain.172 Importantly, these changes are not quickly undone, 
even during abstinence, and are likely to be a significant factor 
contributing to relapse.173 In fact, these drug-induced changes 
may take many months or even years to reverse themselves.174 In 
addition, brain damage associated with drug addiction may harm 
parts of the brain responsible for making long-term decisions, 
such as those maximizing long-term welfare over short-term 
pleasure.175 Drug abuse can therefore lead to abnormal 
functioning in parts of the brain that would normally control 
compulsive behavior. These physical changes in a person’s brain 
can thus reduce an individual’s ability to resist a drug when 
exposed to it.176   
                                                          
169 Id.; Sellman, supra note 160, at 8. 
170 Friedman, supra note 160, at 37. 
171 A learning mechanism is, as its name implies, a way that the brain 
incorporates past experiences to apply them to future situations. Such 
mechanisms can include, for example, trial and error comparisons between an 
expected reward and an actual reward, and a model-based mechanism in which 
the brain makes predictions about an environment and then adapts that 
predictive model based on new experiences. See Rick Nauert, Brain Images 
Reveal How Learning Strategies Work, PSYCH CENT. NEWS (June 3, 2010), 
http://psychcentral.com/news/2010/06/01/brain-images-reveal-how-learning-
strategies-work. 
172 Friedman, supra note 160, at 35. 
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 36. 
175 Id.  
176 Nora Volkow & Ting-Kai Li, Drug Addiction: The Neurobiology of 
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Unsurprisingly then, the risk of relapse is one of the most 
significant problems in treatment even among individuals who 
have sustained a prolonged abstinence period.177 Laboratory 
experiments on both humans and animals indicate that primary 
triggers of relapse include exposure to cues associated with 
previous drug taking, exposure to stressors, and exposure to the 
drug itself.178 Other evidence indicates that these factors do not 
necessarily operate independently. For example, one study on rats 
found that the most potent factors in precipitating relapse after 
both short and long periods of abstinence were exposure to a brief 
period of stress and exposure to the drug itself.179 It further found 
that exposure to the drug itself increases the effect of exposure to 
drug-related cues.180 Another study found that exposure to 
stressful events can similarly exacerbate the impact of exposure to 
drug-related cues on drug-seeking behavior, and vice versa.181 
These factors are examined in further detail below.  
 
1. Stress 
 
Exposure to a stressful environment is a significant risk factor 
contributing to drug addiction relapse in humans.182 In one study, 
opiate-addicted individuals who were shown “stress related 
                                                          
Behavior Gone Awry, 5 NATURE REVIEWS 963, 965 (2004). 
177 M.W. Feltenstein & R.E. See, The Neurocircuitry of Addiction: An 
Overview, 154 BRIT. J. PHARMACOLOGY 261, 261 (2008). 
178 Jane Stewart, Psychological and Neural Mechanisms of Relapse, 363 
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 3147, 3147 (2008) 
[hereinafter Stewart, Psychological and Neural Mechanisms]. 
179 Jane Stewart, Pathways to Relapse: The Neurobiology of Drug- and 
Stress-Induced Relapse to Drug-Taking, 25 J. PSYCHIATRY & NEUROSCIENCE 
125, 125 (2000) [hereinafter Stewart, Pathways to Relapse]. 
180 Id. 
181 Xiu Liu & Friedbert Weiss, Additive Effect of Stress and Drug Cues 
on Reinstatement of Ethanol Seeking: Exacerbation by History of Dependence 
and Role of Concurrent Activation of Corticotropin-Releasing Factor and 
Opioid Mechanisms, 22 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7856, 7859 (2002). 
182 Robyn M. Brown & Andrew Lawrence, Neurochemistry Underlying 
Relapse to Opiate Seeking Behavior, 34 NEUROCHEMICAL RES. 1876, 1879 
(2009). 
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imagery” experienced heightened drug cravings.183 Researchers 
found similar results in cocaine-addicted individuals, for whom 
stress-induced hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis responses 
predicted future drug use quantities.184 Animal research likewise 
indicates increased drug cravings in response to stress. 
Researchers studying relapse behavior found that opiate-addicted 
animals that experience foot shock (a small electrical shock to the 
foot to induce stress) are more likely to exhibit drug-seeking 
behavior.185 This demonstrates a strong correlation between 
stressful experiences and heightened drug cravings.  
Additionally, research shows that a stressful environment can 
actually increase a drug’s pleasurable effect. Stress does this by 
“priming” the brain’s reward pathways,186 meaning it increases 
the drugs’ efficacy and thus encourages the addict’s continued 
use.187 Such research is supported by clinical studies of drug 
abusers and alcoholics, in which subjects frequently cite stress as 
a reason for relapse.188 Other research indicates that a history of 
drug abuse can make individuals more sensitive to stressful events 
and thus more vulnerable to relapse.189 These relapse-inducing 
                                                          
183 Id. This “stress-related imagery” was based on the participants’ 
descriptions of recent stressful personal events. After viewing the imagery, 
participants rated how vividly they could imagine the scenario, the extent of 
their opioid craving, and how anxious they felt. See Scott M. Hyman et al., 
Stress and Drug-Cue-Induced Craving in Opioid-Dependent Individuals in 
Naltrexone Treatment, 15 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 134.  
184 Brown & Lawrence, supra note 182, at 1879. The hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal axis (HPA) is a system in the brain that triggers the 
production and release of various hormones and neurotransmitters in response 
to stressful events. These hormones, inter alia, help systems throughout the 
body respond to stressful situations. See Anxiety In-Depth Report, N.Y. 
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/health/guides/symptoms/stress-and-
anxiety/print.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). 
185 Brown & Lawrence, supra note 182, at 1881. 
186 See The Reward Pathway Reinforces Behavior, supra note 11. 
187 Rajita Sinha, How Does Stress Increase the Risk of Drug Relapse and 
Abuse?, 158 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 343, 345 (2001). 
188 Id. at 351. 
189 Stewart, Pathways to Relapse, supra note 179, at 133. 
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factors are clearly at play in the anesthesiology context, with its 
70 to 80-hour workweeks and on-call duties. 
 
2. Drug-related Cues 
 
As a number of studies have shown, exposure to drug cues 
can precipitate relapse by increasing drug cravings.190 These drug 
cues fall into two general categories: “discrete” cues and 
“contextual” cues.191 A “discrete” cue is a physical object 
associated with drug-taking, such as drug paraphernalia.192 A 
“contextual” cue is one associated with a background setting, 
such as a room in which drugs have been previously used.193 The 
resultant heightened craving has been described as a form of 
Pavlovian conditioning194 in which drug-addicted organisms can 
experience withdrawal symptoms in the presence of the usual 
cues, even absent consumption.195 Furthermore, there is evidence 
that drug-related cues tend to capture the attention of drug addicts 
even when they are involved in an unrelated task.196 This suggests 
that the presence of drug cues may cause impulsive drug-seeking 
behavior.197   
                                                          
190 See generally Dan I. Lubman et al., Electrophysiological Evidence of 
the Motivational Salience of Drug Cues in Opiate Addiction, 37 PSYCHOL. 
MED. 1203 (2007); Shepard Siegel, Drug Tolerance, Drug Addiction, and 
Drug Anticipation, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 296 (2005); 
Sinha, supra note 187, at 343. 
191 Brown & Lawrence, supra note 182, at 1882. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Pavlovian (classical) conditioning is a learned association between 
stimuli. “[T]he subject learns to associate a previously unrelated neutral 
stimulus with another stimulus that reliably elicits some kind of reaction.” 
Pavlovian (Classical) Conditioning, IND. UNIV., 
http://www.indiana.edu/~p1013447/ 
dictionary/pavcond.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2014). 
195 Siegel, supra note 190, at 297. 
196 Lubman et al., supra note 190, at 1208. In this study, the participants’ 
task was to press a button as quickly as possible whenever a white cup was 
displayed. Id. at 1205.   
197 Id. at 1208. 
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3. Drug Exposure and its Effects on Stressors and Cues 
 
Greater levels of past drug use often correlate with greater 
levels of cue sensitivity.198 In addition, repeated drug use 
increases the brain’s stimulus-award associations and forms a 
type of “addiction memory” that increases craving.199 Drug 
exposure can also change sensitivity to future drug exposure and 
stressors.200 To make matters worse for recovering addicts, 
stimuli that lead to this type of conditioned response maintain 
their effect well into abstinence.201 Even after “extinction 
training,”202 in which the ability of cues to provoke relapse is 
reduced or eliminated, exposure to stress or the drug itself can 
rejuvenate the effects of the conditioned response to 
environmental cues.203 
As the above studies show, researchers consistently identify 
(1) cues associated with previous drug taking; (2) exposure to 
stressors; and (3) exposure to the drug itself, as primary triggers 
of relapse into drug use. Courts should take a practical approach 
and keep these factors in mind when considering whether a 
recovering addict should be awarded LTD benefits.   
 
  
                                                          
198 Rajita Sinha, Modeling Stress and Drug Craving in the Laboratory: 
Implications for Addiction Treatment Development, 14 ADDICTION BIOLOGY 
84, 85 (2008). 
199 Bryon Adinoff, Neurobiologic Processes in Drug Reward and 
Addiction, 12 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 305, 311 (2004). 
200 Stewart, Psychological and Neural Mechanisms, supra note 178, at 
3153. 
201 Id. 
202 “Extinction training” refers to a process that attempts to disassociate 
the drug cue from the drug itself. In animal experimentation this is done, for 
example, by training an animal to perform a task that results in the drug’s 
administration and then performing “extinction training,” in which the 
previous task no longer provides the drug. Id. at 3148.   
203 Id. at 3153–54. 
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B. Additional Factor: Genetics 
 
Genetics also plays a role in drug addiction.204 Alcoholism has 
been shown to have a strong genetic component, and recent 
research has provided evidence that drug addiction is also a 
heritable disorder.205 It is estimated that genetic factors are 
responsible for forty to sixty percent of drug addiction 
vulnerability, with environmental factors responsible for the 
remainder.206 Animal research indicates the heritability of drug 
addiction at 0.4 for hallucinogens, 0.7 for cocaine, and slightly 
above 0.5 for alcohol.207 As a result of such studies, addiction has 
come to be regarded as a “complex genetic disease.”208 
The specific genes involved in addiction are unknown, but 
recent data indicate a relationship between drug addiction and the 
genes that encode dopamine receptors.209 Specifically, a study of 
2,364 current opiate abusers or dependents indicated that the 
dopamine D2 receptor bears a highly significant link to the risk of 
opiate addiction.210 Dopamine release is necessary for brain 
“reward,” and all addictive drugs produce enhanced dopamine 
levels.211 This process not only “hijacks” the system normally 
                                                          
204 Sellman, supra note 160, at 7; Jerzy Vetulani, Drug Addiction. Part II. 
Neurobiology of Addiction., 53 POLISH J. PHARMACOLOGY 303, 313 (2001). 
205 Sellman, supra note 160, at 7; Vetulani, supra note 204, at 313. 
206 See Chuan-Yun Li et al., supra note 164, at 28. 
207 Sellman, supra note 160, at 7. “Heritability” is an estimate of the 
genetic component of a trait, and ranges from zero to one. David Goldman et 
al., The Genetics of Addictions: Uncovering the Genes, 6 NATURE REVIEWS: 
GENETICS 521, 522 (2005). 
208 Sellman, supra note 160, at 7. 
209 Gorwood et al., supra note 160, at 803. 
210 Id. at 810. “Abuse” is the recurrent use of drugs despite adverse 
consequences. “Dependence” is another word for addiction, and manifests 
itself through symptoms such as heightened tolerance and withdrawal 
symptoms. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPENDIX E: 
SUBSTANCE USE, ABUSE, DEPENDENCE CONTINUUM, AND PRINCIPLES OF 
EFFECTIVE TREATMENT, available at 
http://www.ncsacw.samhsa.gov/files/SAFERR_AppendixE.pdf. The cases 
cited in this Note involve both abusers and dependents. 
211 Feltenstein & See, supra note 177, at 265. 
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used to experience the rewarding effects of natural survival 
functions, such as eating, but creates a lasting effect that 
promotes further use of the substance.212 
As mentioned, however, more research is needed to 
determine the specific genes involved in drug addiction 
susceptibility.213 Mapping of the human genome at the beginning 
of the century stirred hopes of isolating a handful of genes 
primarily affecting drug addiction.214 These hopes have not yet 
been realized, and researchers are still examining hundreds of 
enormously complex, linked, and variant genes.215 Despite these 
challenges, the concept of addiction as an interaction of genetic 
and environmental factors is now the “dominant paradigm” over 
the traditional view of drug abuse as an exercise of free will.216 
Taken as a whole, this research indicates that drug relapse is 
anything but a choice. Instead, it provides strong support for the 
view that addiction and relapse are the products of genetics, 
stress, and external stimuli, including the drug itself. Notably, 
these factors are often unavoidable because they are a result of 
genetics or are inherent in the addict’s occupation. 
 
V. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Why Stanford is Flawed 
 
The Fourth Circuit’s Stanford decision is flawed for five 
reasons. First, Stanford contravenes ERISA’s underlying 
purpose. Second, it is at odds with the current understanding of 
addiction science. Third, it fails to distinguish the risk of relapse 
from other chronic ailments and thus fails to show why it should 
be treated differently than those ailments. Fourth, it runs counter 
to recently enacted legislation on mental health and addiction. 
Finally, it disregards strong public policy arguments supporting a 
                                                          
212 Id.  
213 See Gorwood et al., supra note 160, at 803. 
214 Sellman, supra note 160, at 7. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
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contrary decision. For these reasons, courts should follow the 
First Circuit’s approach outlined in Colby and regard the risk of 
relapse into substance abuse as a current disability. 
 
1. The Fourth Circuit’s Stanford Decision is Contrary to 
ERISA’s Purpose and Supreme Court Precedent Regarding the 
Interpretation of ERISA 
 
 Congress made its purpose clear when it passed ERISA.217 
Its stated goal was to “protect interstate commerce and employee 
benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . by establishing standards 
of conduct, responsibility and obligation for fiduciaries of 
employee benefit plans . . . .”218 As the Supreme Court noted in 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, “ERISA abounds with the 
language of trust law,” and requires that plan administrators, as 
fiduciaries, uphold “certain principles developed in the evolution 
of the law of trusts.”219 When ERISA administrators violate their 
fiduciary duties, ERISA allows policyholders to bring a cause of 
action against them.220 In Firestone, the Court referred to ERISA 
section 1104, which states “a fiduciary shall discharge his duties 
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries” and “for the exclusive purpose of providing 
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.”221 The Kufner 
court explained that ERISA imposes “higher than marketplace 
quality standards on insurers.”222 The implication of this 
requirement is that insurers must sometimes interpret ERISA 
benefit plans in a way that does not maximize profitability. 
Insurers who wish to avoid covering particular conditions must 
write their plans in a way that clearly circumscribes their 
obligations. 
                                                          
217 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). 
218 Id. 
219 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989).  
220 Id. 
221 Id. (construing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) and § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (1974)). 
222 Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785, 797 
(W.D. Mich. 2009) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 
115 (2008)). 
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This conception of ERISA is difficult to square with the 
Fourth Circuit’s contention that Mr. Stanford was not entitled to 
disability benefits unless he was actively abusing a drug.223 The 
court argued that Mr. Stanford’s inability to return to his former 
job as a nurse anesthetist was not a result of a physical or mental 
impairment but rather “the result of a license limitation and the 
prudence of employers.”224 The court’s narrow understanding of 
“mental impairment,” which excluded addiction, is in stark 
contrast to the plain language of ERISA. As the statute states, 
fiduciaries are to discharge their duties “solely in the interest of 
participants and beneficiaries” and “for the exclusive purpose of 
providing benefits to the participants and their beneficiaries.”225 
This language indicates that addicts should be entitled to benefits 
during the recovery period. While administrators have some 
discretion in deciding whether a particular condition constitutes a 
current disability, administrators (and the courts reviewing their 
decisions) may not ignore the statute’s plain text. The insurer’s 
decision to deny benefits to Mr. Stanford unless he relapsed, 
upheld by the Fourth Circuit, was clearly not “solely” in his 
interest and was thus contrary to the statute’s plain language. 
Stanford also failed to properly account for the conflict of 
interest that resulted from the insurer’s dual role as the evaluator 
and payer of claims. In Firestone, the Court explained that 
ERISA plan administrators often operate under a conflict of 
interest and that reviewing courts should therefore consider this 
as a factor in reviewing benefit denials.226 The Fourth Circuit 
determined that it was to review the insurer’s determination under 
                                                          
223 Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2008). 
224 Id. 
225 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012). 
226 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); see 
also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008) (“Often the 
entity that administers the plan, such as an employer or an insurance company, 
both determines whether an employee is eligible for benefits and pays benefits 
out of its own pocket. We here decide that this dual role creates a conflict of 
interest; that a reviewing court should consider that conflict as a factor in 
determining whether the plan administrator has abused its discretion in denying 
benefits; and that the significance of the factor will depend upon the 
circumstances of the particular case.” (citation omitted)). 
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a “modified abuse of discretion” standard: this standard required 
it to “reduce [its] deference only to the degree necessary to 
neutralize any untoward influence resulting from the insurer’s 
conflict of interest, as shown in the record.”227 Because Mr. 
Stanford did not demonstrate a conflict of interest, the court did 
not reduce its deference.228 
Several months after Stanford was decided, the Supreme 
Court clarified the “conflict of interest” addressed in Firestone. 
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn,229 Supreme Court 
explicitly stated that an administrator, which both evaluates 
claims and make payments, operates under a conflict of interest 
(which the plaintiff need not demonstrate). It further stated that 
the significance of this element is fact-specific.230 The Court noted 
that while ERISA’s trust law basis requires deference to the 
fiduciary’s determination, courts must take this conflict of interest 
into account.231 
While the Fourth Circuit later acknowledged in Champion v. 
Black & Decker232 that Glenn would have required it to weigh this 
conflict as a factor despite Mr. Stanford’s failure to demonstrate a 
conflict, it is unlikely that this weighing would have changed the 
result.233 In Stanford, the court explained that a plaintiff must 
produce evidence that an administrator’s decision was motivated 
by a conflict of interest.234 Since Mr. Stanford failed to produce 
evidence of this motivation, the court stated that a decision to 
                                                          
227 Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 357 (4th Cir. 2008). 
228 Id. at 359. 
229 See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 118. 
230 Id. at 108. 
231 See id. at 115.  
232 Champion v. Black & Decker Inc., 550 F.3d 353, 355–56 (4th. Cir. 
2008). 
233 In Champion, the court stated that Glenn required it to apply the abuse 
of discretion standard, not the more deferential “modified abuse of discretion 
standard,” to cases such as Stanford. Id. at 355. In Champion, applying the 
abuse of discretion standard, the court determined that the conflict of interest 
factor carried little weight. The court acknowledged the conflict but considered 
it as “one among many factors” and ruled that the ERISA administrator’s 
denial of benefits was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 355–56. 
234 Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 357 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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overturn the denial would be based upon the mere existence of a 
conflict, which would eliminate deference entirely.235 However, 
the court indicated that the result would have been the same even 
if Mr. Stanford had demonstrated a conflict: “[w]e cannot say 
that [the insurer’s] conclusion is unreasonable, even in light of 
[its] conflict of interest as insurer and administrator of the benefit 
plan . . . .”236 The court held that the insurer’s interpretation of 
the plan, that the plan did not cover the “potential risk of 
relapse,” was reasonable whether or not a conflict existed. 
Stanford therefore rested primarily upon the premise that the 
“risk of relapse” is not a “current disability.” Such an 
interpretation is inconsistent with an insurer’s requirement to 
“discharge [its] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest 
of the participants and beneficiaries.”237 
 
2.  Recent Psychology Research Further Undermines Stanford 
 
A fundamental problem with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in 
Stanford is that it is based on the discredited notion that an 
addict’s decision to use drugs is the result of choice, and not of 
disease.238 According to the Fourth Circuit, “[w]hether [a 
recovering addict] succumbs to [the temptation to use drugs] 
remains his choice; the heart-attack prone doctor has no such 
choice.”239 This notion is contrary to current psychology research 
indicating that relapses can occur well into abstinence because of 
lasting physical changes to the brain that result in a loss of control 
over drug use.240 Recent evidence strongly undermines the notion 
that continued drug use is a choice.241 With this research in mind, 
                                                          
235 Id. at 359. 
236 Id. at 358. 
237 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) 
(construing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) and § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (1974)). 
238 See Friedman, supra note 160, at 35. 
239 Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358. 
240 See Friedman, supra note 160, at 35. 
241 See generally Friedman, supra note 160; see also Gorwood et al., 
supra note 160 (describing drug dependence as a “chronic, relapsing 
disorder”); Sellman, supra note 160 (describing addiction as a “complex 
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it is clear that the court’s reasoning in Stanford is based on the 
flawed notion that addiction is a choice, not a disease with a 
strong genetic component.242 
In Stanford, the insurer argued that an addict’s decision to use 
drugs is a choice by defining “choice” in extremely narrow 
terms. The insurer contrasted an addict to “a patient with an 
unacceptably high susceptibility to suffering from a heart attack” 
and declared that the patient “cannot avoid such heart attack by 
choosing not to have it.”243 It is true that a recovering addict 
could presumably encounter a situation in which drugs are readily 
available, yet decide not to use them. In this sense, he has a 
“choice” that one who is susceptible to heart attacks does not. 
However, this “choice” evaporates when the addict with a genetic 
predisposition and a physically altered brain is placed in a 
situation in which drugs are readily available. His decision to use 
drugs in such circumstances seems, if anything, less of a 
“choice” than a heart attack-prone patient’s decision not to 
exercise or to eat fatty foods. The insurer’s interpretation of the 
word “choice” is thus extremely narrow and unfairly applied to 
recovering addicts.   
Even if we do accept the Fourth Circuit’s notion of addiction 
as a choice, many other chronic medical conditions (for which 
benefits are generally provided) are also the result of choice.244 
For example, atherosclerosis, type 2 diabetes, and hypertension 
are all chronic conditions that are partially the result of voluntary 
behavior, such as diet.245 Unsurprisingly, the treatment for each 
of these conditions often involves voluntary lifestyle changes.246 
An addict’s “choice” to use drugs is not easily distinguished from 
the lifestyle choices that contribute to these ailments, so to treat 
addiction differently on this basis is simply unjust.  
                                                          
genetic disease”). 
242 Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358. 
243 Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 
7, Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 438 (E.D.N.C. 2006) 
(No. 5:05-CV-372-BR(3)). 
244 See Friedman, supra note 160, at 36. 
245 Id. 
246 See id. 
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One could perhaps argue that an addict’s initial decision to 
use drugs was a choice, and the lasting changes that the drugs 
caused to his brain only occurred as a result of this initial choice. 
Leaving addiction’s strong genetic component aside, this 
argument fails to distinguish addiction for the same reasons 
described in the preceding paragraph. One could argue that the 
individual suffering from atherosclerosis, type 2 diabetes, or 
hypertension only developed his condition as a result of his initial 
unhealthy lifestyle choices, and that the continued risk of a heart 
attack, for example, is a result of those earlier choices. 
As argued above, psychology research has demonstrated that 
drug addiction is a genetic disease, and future courts should 
consider this in making their decisions. Courts often rely on 
psychology research to support their holdings in areas where the 
law is not settled, and the Supreme Court has done so in some 
landmark decisions.247 Most notably, in Brown v. Board of 
Education, the Court cited psychology research indicating that 
“[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has 
a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is 
greater when it has the sanction of the law . . . .”248 More 
recently, in Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits mandatory life imprisonment without 
parole for those who committed crimes prior to age eighteen.249 
In support of its position, the Court stated “that developments in 
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental 
differences between juvenile and adult minds . . . in parts of the 
brain involved in behavior control.”250 Stanford was based on the 
discredited notion that an addict’s use of drugs is a “choice” and 
courts should look to current research to support decisions that 
recognize addiction as a genetic disease, and thus treat it as a 
“current disability.”251 Scientific research is particularly useful on 
this issue because the law remains unsettled. 
                                                          
247 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012); Brown v. 
Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
248 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
249 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
250 Id. at 2464 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
251 See generally sources cited supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
2014.05.13 JUELL.DOCX 5/20/2014  10:44 AM 
1042 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Stanford is further flawed because the court denied LTD 
benefits to an individual for whom returning to work would place 
his health and life, as well as the health and lives of his patients, 
at tremendous risk.252 An overview of current addiction research 
provides overwhelming evidence that the greatest risk factors in 
precipitating drug relapse are (1) stress; (2) exposure to the drug 
itself; and (3) environmental cues.253 In light of these factors, it is 
difficult to imagine a set of circumstances better able to 
precipitate relapse than the placement of an anesthesiologist back 
into a hospital setting where he previously succumbed to opioid 
addiction. The high-pressure hospital setting, combined with long 
hours and easily obtainable drugs of choice, makes relapse all too 
likely. 
 
3.  The Fourth Circuit Failed to Distinguish the Risk of Addictive 
Relapse from the Risk of Relapse of Other Chronic Ailments 
 
The Stanford majority determined that the risk of relapse into 
drug use was fundamentally different from the risk of relapse into 
other chronic ailments.254 According to the court,  
[a] doctor with a heart condition who enters a high 
stress environment . . . “risks relapse” in the sense 
that the performance of his job duties may cause a 
heart attack. But an anesthetist with a drug 
addiction who enters an environment where drugs 
are readily available “risks relapse” only in the 
sense that the ready availability of drugs increases 
his temptation to resume his drug use. Whether he 
succumbs to that temptation remains his choice. 
                                                          
252 Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 362–63 (4th Cir. 
2008) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
253 See Stewart, Psychological and Neural Mechanisms, supra note 178, at 
3153; see also Liu & Weiss, supra note 181, at 7856 (describing stress and 
conditioned responses to drug cues as “critical factors in relapse to drug use”); 
Stewart, Pathways to Relapse, supra note 179, at 125 (describing re-exposure 
to the drug and exposure to stress as the two most important factors in 
reinstating drug-seeking behavior). 
254 Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358. 
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The heart-attack prone doctor has no such 
choice.255 
In his dissent, Judge Wilkinson was harshly critical of this 
attempt to distinguish the risk of relapse from other chronic 
ailments.256 As noted in Part III.A, Judge Wilkinson described the 
majority’s attempt to distinguish drug addiction as “legally 
ungrounded.”257 He said their attempt was based on moral and 
medical considerations that the court had no authority to make 
when the plan “put[] addiction squarely on all fours with other 
impairments.”258 The court’s failure to distinguish addiction from 
other ailments, and yet still deny benefits to Mr. Stanford, 
indicates that the ongoing stigmatization of drug addiction played 
a role in the court’s decision. 
The majority’s attempt to cast disability as a “reward for 
sobriety,” but only in the addiction context, is similarly 
unpersuasive.259 In ruling for the insurer, the court acknowledged 
that its denial of benefits to Mr. Stanford created a perverse 
incentive by denying benefits to those in recovery while providing 
them to those who relapse.260 Nevertheless, the court argued that 
such reasoning assumed that disability was a “reward for 
sobriety” when, in fact, the reward for sobriety was “the creation 
of innumerable opportunities that were closed to Stanford as long 
as he continued to use drugs.”261 It is unclear why the Fourth 
Circuit apparently confined this logic to recovering addicts. The 
court’s logic seems to imply that, like the recovering addict, the 
heart attack-prone doctor should not be entitled to benefits 
because his reward for adopting a healthier lifestyle is the 
“innumerable opportunities that were closed to” him before he 
changed his ways. Despite this obvious inconsistency, the court 
suggested that a heart attack-prone doctor should be entitled to 
benefits.  
                                                          
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 363 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
257 Id.  
258 Id. 
259 See id. at 359. 
260 Stanford, 514 F.3d at 359. 
261 Id. 
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The Stanford majority’s contention that Mr. Stanford could 
work “countless other jobs” and therefore should not be entitled 
to benefits is similarly flawed.262 First, as Judge Wilkinson 
argued in his dissent, the plan’s plain language defined disability 
as an inability “to perform the material and substantial duties of 
your regular occupation.”263 Even with this plain language issue 
aside, the situation the majority describes is not unique to 
individuals recovering from drug addiction. For example, in 
Evans v. UnumProvident Corp.,264 the court held that an insurer’s 
denial of LTD benefits to a plaintiff who suffered from a form of 
epilepsy was arbitrary and capricious.265 In making its 
determination, the court noted that while the plaintiff was capable 
of performing sedentary work, she was still disabled because the 
stressful nature of her work contributed to her recurrent 
seizures.266 Presumably, the plaintiff was capable of performing 
other, less stressful jobs, but this fact did not render her ineligible 
for LTD benefits. In this sense, her condition was no different 
from that of an anesthesiologist who is physically capable of 
performing other jobs, yet cannot return to anesthesiology 
because the stressful nature of the job contributes to relapse. In 
either case, the individual lacks a functional impairment that 
renders him unable to physically perform some type of 
occupation, yet LTD benefits will still be provided; there is no 
compelling reason to treat the two conditions differently.  
 
4. Recent Policy Enactments Support the View that Addiction 
Should be Treated Like Other Ailments 
 
The notion that addiction should be treated like other ailments 
is supported by congressional legislation.267 On November 8, 
                                                          
262 See id. at 359–60. 
263 Id. at 362 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
264 Evans v. UnumProvident Corp., 434 F.3d 866, 879–80 (6th Cir. 
2006). 
265 Id. at 869. 
266 Id. at 879–80. 
267 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (1996); see also Ellen Weber, Equality 
Standards for Health Insurance Coverage: Will the Mental Health Parity and 
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2013, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 
Kathleen Sebelius announced regulations that would enforce the 
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (Parity 
Act)268 and extend its reach to those receiving coverage under the 
Affordable Care Act.269 Congress enacted the Parity Act in order 
to prevent health plans from discriminating against individuals 
with mental and substance abuse disorders by requiring that the 
plans’ standards for those conditions be comparable to those for 
other medical conditions.270 The Parity Act prohibits “limits on 
the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage or 
other similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment” when 
such conditions are not imposed upon coverage for other medical 
conditions.271 It also prohibits plans from imposing more stringent 
financial requirements upon those suffering from mental health 
issues or addiction.272 This means that plans cannot impose 
different “deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, [or] out-of-
pocket expenses” on mental health and addiction treatment.273  
The Parity Act’s legislative history reveals that Congress 
intended to curtail the widespread practice of insurer 
discrimination against those with mental illness and substance-
related disorders.274 The Committee on Ways and Means issued a 
report stating: “[t]he Committee believes that the discrimination 
                                                          
Addiction Act End the Discrimination?, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 179, 
207–08 (2013). 
268 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2008). 
269 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See also 
Jackie Calmes & Robert Pear, Rules to Require Equal Coverage for Mental 
Ills, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/us/politics/ 
rules-to-require-equal-coverage-for-mental-ills.html. 
270 Weber, supra note 267, at 207–08. 
271 Id. at 210. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. It is important to note that the Parity Act does not require plans to 
cover mental health or substance disorder benefits. It only requires that when 
such benefits are provided, they must be on equal footing with medical and 
surgical benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)–(b) (2012). 
274 H.R. REP. NO. 110-374, at 1551 (2007). 
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that exists under many group health plans with respect to mental 
health and substance-related disorder benefits must be prohibited. 
Diseases of the mind should be afforded the same treatment as 
diseases of the body.”275 The Committee went on to describe 
addiction and mental health disorders as “the only disorders that 
have been systematically and unfairly excluded from equal 
coverage.”276 The Parity Act and its legislative history 
demonstrate Congress’ intent to fight arbitrary and discriminatory 
treatment of those suffering from addiction or mental illness.277 
In Stanford, the insurer had apparently discriminated against 
Mr. Stanford because his impairment was “mental.” The plan 
required benefits once the claimant established an “injury or 
sickness caus[ing] physical or mental impairment to such a degree 
of severity that [he is] . . . continuously unable to perform the 
material and substantial duties of [his] regular occupation.”278 The 
insurer explained that Mr. Stanford did not suffer “a physical or 
mental impairment as a result of his drug use or recovery” and 
that being an addict did not render him unable to perform the 
material duties of his occupation.279 The insurer’s narrow 
understanding of “mental impairment” was unjustified, and the 
Fourth Circuit should not have upheld it. 
 
5.  Providing LTD Benefits to Recovering Addicts is Good Public 
Policy 
 
There are compelling public policy arguments for providing 
LTD benefits to recovering drug addicts. The Committee on 
Ways and Means’ reasons for passing the Parity Act are equally 
applicable to the “addiction as a current disability” debate.280 The 
Committee cited a 2006 study that described the prevalence of 
mental and substance abuse-related disorders, which affected 
nearly a quarter of the U.S. population and cost more than $300 
                                                          
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Stanford v. Continental Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir. 2008). 
279 Id. 
280 H.R. REP. NO. 110-374, at 1569–70. 
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billion annually.281 A recent study found that 22.2 million 
Americans suffered from substance abuse or dependence in 2012, 
a number that had remained stable over the prior decade.282   
As mentioned, a number of courts have also made compelling 
public policy arguments for treating the risk of relapse into drug 
addiction as a “current disability.”283 Even in Stanford, the 
majority acknowledged that its denial of benefits to Mr. Stanford 
“create[d] a somewhat troubling—some might say perverse—
incentive structure: an addict who continues to abuse drugs will 
be entitled to long-term benefits, but upon choosing sobriety will 
lose those benefits unless he again begins to use drugs.”284 As 
Judge Wilkinson argued in his dissent, “[f]orcing Stanford to 
relapse into addiction or lose his benefits would. . .thwart the 
very purpose for which disability plans exist: to help people 
overcome medical adversity if possible, and otherwise to cope 
with it.”285 Few would argue that a bartender who was forced to 
leave work as a result of alcoholism should be compelled to 
return to work during recovery because his benefits would 
discontinue. Disability plans should not force addicted individuals 
to choose between losing benefit payments on the one hand and 
relapsing on the other. 
The Kufner court also considered public policy implications in 
its decision to treat the risk of relapse as a current disability.286 It 
described the insurer’s implication that the plaintiff could return 
to work until he suffered a relapse as “untenable given the serious 
risk this poses to public health and safety, which the Court 
considers an additional factor weighing against defendant’s 
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benefits determination.”287 As described in Part III.B, the court 
labeled this risk “a form of ‘benefits Russian roulette’ with 
plaintiff’s career and his patients’ lives at risk.”288 The court 
further described the insurer’s position as “tantamount to a 
breach of the public trust” and clearly contrary to its duties under 
ERISA.289 While danger to the public is particularly acute in the 
anesthesiology context, it is also a serious concern in other areas 
as well. For example, a relapsed crane operator, air traffic 
controller, or train engineer could pose tremendous risks to the 
public. None should be forced to choose between relapsing and 
losing benefits.  
 
B.  A Middle Ground Between Colby and Stanford? 
 
In Colby, the First Circuit proposed an untenable middle 
ground between its own holding and that in Stanford. According 
to the court, on remand, the insurer could have examined whether 
the risk of relapse decreased over time and, if it did, argued for a 
corresponding benefit reduction.290 Instead, the insurer took a 
categorical approach and argued that any risk of relapse, no 
matter how severe, did not constitute a current disability under 
the plan.291 The result of this all-or-nothing approach was the 
court’s award of a full thirty-six months of benefits.292 
This argument, that the risk of relapse progressively 
diminishes over time, is unsupported by current psychology 
research.293 As noted previously, substance abuse causes lasting 
changes in the brain, and these changes play a significant role in 
precipitating relapse.294 Research also demonstrates that 
“exposure to a drug can initiate neurochemical changes with 
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enduring molecular and anatomical consequences that affect 
subsequent responses to events that induce relapse.”295 These 
changes “continue to manifest themselves well into abstinence 
and may be a cause of the relapses into compulsive drug use that 
can occur long after the drug has been cleared from the body.”296 
While a recent study of methamphetamine-dependent individuals 
found some evidence that impulsive decision making decreases 
over time, the study also found evidence that cue-induced 
cravings increase over time, and therefore concluded that the risk 
of relapse does not decline with abstinence.297 The First Circuit’s 
proposed alternative argument finds little support in recent 
psychology research. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
Under LTD plans, there is no principled reason to 
differentiate the risk of addictive relapse from other medical 
impairments.298 Accordingly, other courts should follow the First 
Circuit’s Colby decision. The Fourth Circuit’s Stanford decision 
contravenes Supreme Court precedent, which had illustrated the 
high standards that ERISA places upon plan administrators. These 
standards require administrators to discharge their duties “solely 
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries,” not in their 
own financial self-interest, as the insurer apparently did in 
Stanford.299 Stanford also contravenes current psychology 
research, which shows that addiction is not a “choice” but a 
disease that physically changes the brain in ways that last well 
into abstinence.300  Thus, a recovering addict who is not actively 
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using drugs is still “currently disabled” and should be entitled to 
LTD benefits under ERISA-governed LTD benefit plans.  
Furthermore, Stanford could have dire ramifications. It 
incentivizes recovering addicts to return to work before they are 
ready. With regard to anesthesiology, this inhibits the recovery 
process by placing addicts into an environment that is extremely 
conducive to relapse due to high stress levels and easily 
accessible drugs. Patients are similarly put at risk because 
anesthesiology is a crucial and complex component of many 
medical procedures. The risks of Stanford-like decisions are not 
limited to anesthesiology, but extend to any occupation that 
affects public safety and health. 
The First Circuit’s Colby decision, holding that the risk of 
relapse into drug addiction can be so severe as to constitute a 
current disability, avoids these potentially disastrous 
consequences. Further, Colby holds true to the congressional 
intent behind ERISA and the Parity Act. The Parity Act reflects a 
larger societal trend that recognizes the devastating effects of 
addiction and sees it as a disease rather than a choice or lack of 
willpower. Additionally, society has increasingly come to 
recognize that the way to deal with the pervasive problem of drug 
addiction is not to stigmatize users or blame them for poor 
decision-making, but to treat their condition as a chronic ailment 
on par with any other. Courts should therefore follow the First 
Circuit’s lead and do their part to move society forward on this 
issue. 
